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1 Introduction
Some things are relative. Left and right are relative to spatial orientation,
for example, and legality is relative to jurisdiction. We also wonder about
more controversial cases. Is morality relative to culture? Is color relative
to type of perceiver? In this essay I am not concerned with any particular
relativistic thesis. Rather, I am concerned with the prior question: What is
it for one thing to be relative to another?
This question is interesting, I think, not only for its own sake, but also
because it has considerable bearing on first-order disputes between absolutists
and relativists. Some of the most formidable objections to relativism are
metaphysical in nature. Relativism is true, these objections allege, only if
the world is ontologically thus-and-so, and the world is not ontologically
thus-and-so. There are a variety of metaphysical arguments run against
relativism, but I want to focus on two sorts, which I label ‘arity arguments’
and ‘simplicity arguments’.
Let me begin with arity arguments. Many philosophers believe that there
is some intimate connection between relativity and degrees of relationality.
According to Robert Streiffer (2004, 4), for example, if moral relativism is
true, then moral properties
. . . have an extra argument place, the value of which varies from
context to context. So, although one might have thought that
the property of being immoral was a one-place property, which a
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particular action either has or does not have, in fact there is no
such one-place property. Rather, there is a two-place relation of
being immoral relative to a morality, and any particular action
bears this relation to some moralities, but not to others.
To a similar effect, Crispin Wright (2008, 158–159) says,1
The ground-level relativistic idea is that the satisfaction-conditions
of a certain property or family of properties, though superficially
presenting as unary, are actually implicitly relational—or more
generally, are of a higher degree of relationality than is apparent
in the surface syntax. . . . [The] tacit relationality need not be
to the effect that a certain apparently unary property is in fact
binary. It may be to the effect that a certain apparently n-ary
property is in fact n+k-ary, k > 0.
Let properties include both properties and relations, and let the arity of a
property be its degree of relationality. On the conception of relativity that
Streiffer and Wright put forward, an apparently n-ary property is relative to
a parameter only if the property is n+k-ary, k > 0. It follows trivially, then,
that relativity and n-ary-ness are incompatible: an apparently n-ary
property can be relative, or n-ary, but not both.
The claim that relativity and n-ary-ness are incompatible in turn can be
used as a weapon, for its truth makes relativism vulnerable to a particular
line of attack. One can argue that though we might have good reasons for
thinking that some apparently n-ary properties are relative, we have even
better reasons for thinking that the properties are in fact n-ary, and hence
that we should, all things considered, reject relativism. I call these arity
arguments. As we will see, arity arguments feature prominently in debates
between absolutists and relativists and across a wide variety of domains.2
I think that arity arguments are unconvincing. Arity arguments are only
as good as their crucial claim, viz., that relativity and n-ary-ness are incom-
patible, and I think that this claim is false. The main thesis of this essay is
1Emphasis is original.
2See the discussion of shape relativism and truth relativism in §2 and the discussion of
color relativism in §6. Also see Paul Boghossian’s (2006; 2011) argument against moral
relativism.
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that there are at least three ontological schemes that can engender relativ-
ity. On two of these ontological schemes, I argue, relativity and n-ary-ness
are compatible. Arity arguments, therefore, cannot establish the falsity of
relativism; the most they can establish is that one of the ontological schemes
that can engender relativity fails to obtain. In response to an arity argument,
a relativist can always adopt one of the other ontological schemes.
Let me turn to simplicity arguments. The thesis that relativity and n-ary-
ness are compatible, though once roundly rejected,3 has gained in popularity
of late.4 But even among philosophers who accept that relativity and n-ary-
ness are compatible, many insist that relativists are nevertheless committed
to positing extra arity. “Perhaps an apparently n-ary property can be both
relative and n-ary,” these philosophers will say, “but only if we increase
the arity of instantiation. After all, the extra arity must go somewhere.” If
relativists are committed to positing extra arity, then we can run an epicyclic
version of the argument laid out above. One can argue that though we
might have good reasons for thinking that the apparently n-ary properties
are relative, we have even better reasons for accepting the conjunction—that
the properties are n-ary and that instantiation is binary—and hence that we
should, all things considered, reject relativism. I shall call these simplicity
arguments because, as we will see, they involve the notion of ‘being F
simpliciter ’.
Simplicity arguments are thought to succeed where arity arguments fail.5
An absolutist runs an arity argument against relativism; the relativist re-
sponds by adopting a different relativity-engendering ontological scheme; the
absolutist responds, in turn, by running a simplicity argument. The most
surprising claim that I make in this essay is that relativists can respond
to simplicity arguments by again adopting a different relativity-engendering
3A particularly clear example is Monroe Beardsley (1983, 265), who begins his essay
with this passage: “One way of looking at relativism is this. If Smith holds that a certain
predicate, P, is an n-place predicate, and Jones holds that P is an (n + 1)-place predicate,
then Jones is a P-relativist, relative to Smith.”
4See, e.g., Fine (2005), Forbes (1987), Haslanger (1989; 2003), Johnston (1987), and
Lowe (1987; 1988). Although I think that they are after a slightly different point, also see
Brogaard (2010) and Egan (2006b; 2010a).
5See, e.g., Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009; 2011) and Lewis (2002).
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ontological scheme. Relativists are not committed to positing extra arity: in-
stantiation might be binary, the apparently n-ary properties might be n-ary,
and still relativism might be true.
2 Shape Relativism
Let us look at the particular case of shape relativism, since it was in discus-
sions of shapes (and other temporary intrinsic properties) that this dialectic
concerning arity and relativity first arose.
In the 1980s a debate emerged between perdurantists and endurantists
about the nature of persistence.6 Many people find endurantism more intu-
itive, at least initially. But certain arguments favor perdurantism. One of
the main arguments for perdurantism is the problem of temporary intrinsics.7
As David Lewis (2002, 1) puts it:
The problem about persistence is the problem of change, insofar
as it pertains to intrinsic properties. Things somehow persist
through time. When they do, they have some of their intrinsic
properties temporarily. For instance shape: sometimes you sit,
and then you are bent; sometimes you stand or lie, and then you
are straight. How can one and the same thing have two contrary
properties? How does it help that it has them at different times?
An adequate account of persistence must explain how something can be both
bent at t1 and straight at t2, despite the fact that nothing can be both and
straight.8
6See, e.g., Forbes (1987), Haslanger (1989), Johnston (1987), Lewis (1986), and Lowe
(1987; 1988). For a discussion of how to distinguish perdurantism and endurantism, see
Fine (2006b) and Sider (2003).
7The problem of temporary intrinsics is a misnomer; it has nothing essentially to do
with intrinsic properties. Cf., Johnston (1987, 113).
8Cf. Johnston (1987, 115): “This then is the problem of persistence cast in the formal
mode: explain the role of temporal qualification in our attributions of change, where
explaining does not just mean opting for a style of appending ‘t’s and ‘t*’s but defending
the views about properties, the nature of time and the nature of persisting individuals
which justify this style of appending.”
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Lewis sees three potential solutions to the problem of temporary intrin-
sics: namely, perdurantism, endurantism together with presentism, and en-
durantism together with shape relativism. Lewis then argues piecewise; he
argues that presentism is false, that shape relativism is false, and hence that
endurantists have no satisfactory solution to the problem of temporary in-
trinsics. For the sake of argument I am going to grant Lewis his claim that
presentism is false. I want to focus on his argument against shape relativism.
(To anticipate, I think the argument fails: even if presentism is false, the
problem of temporary intrinsics gives us no reason to reject endurantism.)
Lewis (1986) begins his argument against shape relativism with a sub-
stantive assumption about the nature of relativity. Lewis assumes that the
only way for some properties to be relative to a parameter is to increase
the arity of the properties, where we increase the arity of the properties
by building into them an additional argument place that takes values of the
parameter as relata.9 If we increase the arity of shape properties, then, as
Lewis (1986, 204) puts it,
. . . contrary to what we might think, shapes are not genuine in-
trinsic properties. They are disguised relations, which an endur-
ing thing may bear to times. One and the same enduring thing
may bear the bent-shape relation to some times, and the straight-
shape relation to others.
Of course, even if shapes are binary properties, there are unary properties
in the vicinity. We should distinguish plugged and unplugged properties.
Given any unplugged n-ary property Rn < x1, x2, . . . , xn >, we can replace
one or more of the variables by objects, and the result is a plugged property.
If, for instance, we increase the arity of shapes, then we do away with the
unplugged unary shape properties being bent and being straight, and in their
place we put the unplugged binary properties being bent at and being straight
at, which relate objects to times, and two large families of plugged unary
9The phrase ‘increasing the arity of shape properties’ is perhaps somewhat misleading,
as properties have their arities essentially. To increase the arity of shape properties is to
claim (i) that the unary properties, which were thought to be the shape properties, either
fail to exist or are anyway uninstantiated and (ii) that ‘shape properties’, in fact, name a
collection of 1+k-ary properties, k > 0. See Boghossian (2006; 2011).
5
properties being bent at t1, being bent at t2, . . . , and being straight at t1,
being straight at t2, . . . . To say that shapes are binary is to say, in an
abbreviated way, that the unplugged shape properties are binary.
For Lewis, the unarity of shape is a Moorean fact, more certain that any
philosophical thesis to the contrary. “If we know what shape is,” says Lewis
(1986, 204), “we know that it is a property, not a relation.” Lewis thus
argues against shape relativism in the straightforward way: shape relativism
implies that shapes are binary, but shapes are not binary, so shape relativism
is false.
Endurantists were quick to respond.10 Shapes may be unary properties,
they said, but the unarity of shape does not cut against shape relativism.
For there is more than one way to be a shape relativist. We can increase
the arity of shapes, or we can increase the arity of instantiation—do
away with the unplugged binary instantiation relation and replace it with
an unplugged ternary instantiation relation and a large family of plugged
binary instantiation relations, one for each instant of time. Shape relativism
engendered by increasing the arity of instantiation is perfectly compatible
with shapes being unary.
Lewis, who revisits the problem of temporary intrinsics in 2002, concedes
the point. He grants that shape relativism is compatible with the unarity of
shape, and in so doing grants that there are at least two ontological schemes
that can engender relativity. But Lewis thinks that the resultant ontology
remains objectionable (2002, 5):
I protest that there is still nothing in the picture that has bent
or straight simpliciter. Not you; not your nonexistent temporal
parts. Instead of having bent simpliciter, you bear the having-at
relation to it and t1. But it is one thing to have a property, it
is something else to bear some relation to it. If a relation stands
between you and your properties, you are alienated from them.
We thus arrive at the problem of temporary intrinsics in its most mature
form. It began as an arity argument: Lewis argued that although we might
10See, e.g., Forbes (1987), Haslanger (1989), Johnston (1987), and Lowe (1987; 1988).
Some endurantists defended presentism; see, e.g., Hinchliff (1996). Others disputed the
unarity of shape properties; see, e.g., Wasserman (2003).
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have good reason to believe that shape properties are relative to time, we
have even better reason to believe that shapes are unary, and hence that
we should, all things considered, reject shape relativism. But in response
to endurantistic criticisms, the problem of temporary intrinsics became a
simplicity argument with five premises:
(P1) Persisting objects are simply shaped—where an object is simply shaped
if and only if it stands in the unplugged binary instantiation relation
to an unplugged unary shape property.
(P2) Presentism is false.
(P3) If presentism is false, then endurantism implies shape relativism.
(P4) If shape relativism is true, then shapes are binary or instantiation is
ternary.
(P5) If shapes are binary or instantiation is ternary, then persisting objects
are not simply shaped.
(C) Therefore, endurantism is false.
The crucial claim in a simplicity argument is that relativity and simplicity
are incompatible: that relativism about some property F is incompatible
with objects being F simpliciter.11 Assuming that presentism is false, Lewis
thinks that we are forced to choose—either persisting objects are simply
shaped, or shape is relative to time. Of the two options, Lewis chooses the
former.
Lewis’s theory of persistence is not without its own warts, it should be
noted. There is an intuition that persisting objects are simply shaped, sure,
but there is also an intuition that persisting objects are the bearers of shape
properties. (I am bent. Q : What is bent? A: Me!) Since Lewis thinks
11The notion of ‘being F simpliciter ’ has different meanings as used by different philoso-
phers. On some usages, an object is ‘F simpliciter ’ just if the object is F and relativism
is not true of F . This is not the meaning intended by Lewis (2002) and Cappelen and
Hawthorne (2009; 2011); they do not intend simplicity arguments to be flatly question-
begging. For more on the notion of ‘being F simpliciter ’ in the sense used by Lewis and
Cappelen and Hawthorne, see Merricks (1994), Rea (1998), and Eddon (2010).
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that relativity and simplicity are incompatible, he thinks that the following
three claims cannot all be true: (i) persisting objects change their shape
over time, (ii) persisting objects are the bearers of shape properties, and (iii)
persisting objects are simply shaped. Lewis thus rejects (ii), deeming it the
least plausible of the three. On Lewis’s perdurantism, the bearers of shapes
are the temporal parts of persisting objects; persisting objects, themselves,
have shape properties only in some attenuated and derivative sense. By
Lewis’s own methodological lights, however, it would be better if we could
accommodate all three intuitions. We should accommodate intuition where
we can.
I think that (i), (ii), and (iii) can all be true, for I think that relativity
and simplicity are compatible. In the argument from temporary intrinsics,
(P4) is false.12
I am aware that my position is unpopular. Most philosophers share
Lewis’s belief that relativity and simplicity are incompatible. Michael Rea
(1998, 245) says, “According to [shape relativism], there are no temporary
properties which an object has simpliciter ; there are only those it has-at-
t1 or has tly, for some time t.”13 Speaking to the case of morality, David
Velleman (2013, 45) says,
According to moral relativism, saying that an action is wrong is
like saying someone is tall, a claim elliptical unless indexed to a
reference class, since someone who is tall for an Mbuti may not
be tall for a Kikuyu and it makes no sense to ask whether he is
tall simpliciter. Similarly, says relativism, it makes no sense to
ask whether an action or practice is wrong simpliciter. Claims of
wrongness must be about wrongness-for-members-of-x, where x
ranges over different cultures or societies . . . .14
12Which is not to say that the other premises are true.
13Rea is here paraphrasing Merricks (1994).
14Velleman has told me in personal communication that he does not take this passage
to be making a claim about metaphysics or about relativism in general. The passage
is intended to be a claim about what moral relativists believe. As such, it’s accurate:
relativists—moral relativists included—often assume that relativity and simplicity are
incompatible.
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Moreover, Lewis is not the only philosopher running simplicity arguments
against relativism. In their aptly titled recent book Relativism and Monadic
Truth (2009),15 Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne argue against truth
relativism in exactly the way that Lewis argues against shape relativism.
They argue that propositions are true or false simpliciter ; that truth rela-
tivism is incompatible with propositions being true or false simpliciter, since
truth relativism requires either that truth be binary or that instantiation be
ternary; and hence that we should reject truth relativism.
There are various possible ways to respond to simplicity arguments, but I
think that we can strike at their heart. Relativity and simplicity are compat-
ible: at least one of the ontological schemes that is capable of engendering
relativity is compatible with simplicity. Hence, simplicity arguments, like
arity arguments, cannot establish the falsity of relativism; the most they can
establish is that some of the ontological schemes that can engender relativity
fail to obtain.
Here is the plan for the rest of the essay. As I said above, my thesis is that
there are at least three ontological schemes that are capable of engendering
relativity. Already we have encountered two of them. In the terminology I
will adopt hereafter, the first was relationalism about the properties; the
second was relationalism about instantiation. In §3, I distinguish relation-
alism and variabilism. The distinction between relationalism and variabil-
ism is then defended in §4, clarified in §5, and applied to the case of color
relativism in §6. Finally, in §7, I argue that by applying the relational-
ism/variabilism distinction twice, we can reconcile relativity and simplicity.
3 Variabilism
The purpose of shape relativism is to allow the same object to have different
shapes at different times. One way to achieve this purpose is to construe
shapes as binary properties. Another way, however, is to construe shapes as
unary properties with variable extensions. Let me introduce some terminol-
ogy.
The extension of a property is the set of its instances. For example,
15‘Unary’ and ‘monadic’ are synonyms.
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the extension of being prime is the set of prime numbers, and the extension
of being taller than is the set of ordered pairs <x, y>, such that x is taller
than y. An index on a parameter is a value that the parameter can take.
For example, time is a parameter, and the various instants of time are the
indices; type of perceiver is a parameter, and the various types of perceivers
are the indices.
Given any parameter, we can distinguish the properties that are ‘fixed’
across parameter from the properties that ‘vary’ across the parameter. The
extension of a property is fixed across the parameter if and only if the
extension of the property is (and must be) the same relative to all of the
indices on the parameter. The extension of a property varies across the
parameter if and only if the extension of the property is (or could be)
different relative to different indices on the parameter.16
To illustrate the distinction between fixed and variable extensions, con-
sider the modal case. World is a parameter, and the various worlds are the
indices. Compare two properties, being prime and being spherical. The ex-
tension of being prime is fixed across worlds. That is, if we think of properties
as functions from worlds to sets, then being prime is a constant function that
takes every world to the set {2, 3, 5, 7, . . . }. By contrast, the extension of
being spherical varies across worlds. If Mars is spherical in w1 and pyramidal
in w2, then Mars is in the extension of being spherical relative to w1, but not
relative to w2.
Once you understand the distinction between fixed and variable exten-
sions as it applies to the modal case, you are in a position to understand
the distinction as it applies to any parameter. A property has an extension
that varies across time just if the extension of the property is (or could be)
different relative to different instants of time. A property has an extension
that varies across types of perceivers just if the extension of the property is
(or could be) different relative to different types of perceivers.17
16We can also draw a distinction among parameters: only some parameters have prop-
erties with extensions that vary across them.
17There is another distinction to draw here. An individual can belong to a value
on a parameter. There are many worlds, and I belong to the actual world. There are
many times, and I belong to the present time. There are many types of perceivers, and
I belong to the type of perceiver, whichever it is, that I am. Say that a value of a
10
I can now state the most important structural difference between relation-
alism and variabilism. Relationalism is the way to reconcile relativism and
extensional fixity. In the case of shape, for instance, relationalists do away
with the unplugged unary shape properties and replace them with unplugged
binary properties and families of plugged unary properties. Notice that all
of the properties countenanced by shape relationalists are fixed across time.
This is true in general: all of the properties countenanced by relationalists
are fixed across the parameter in question. By contrast, variabilism is the
way to reconcile relativism and n-ary-ness. Variabilists keep the unplugged
unary properties and construe them as having variable extensions. There is
no way to reconcile relativism with both extensional fixity and n-ary-ness.18
4 The Terminological Objection
I think that the distinction between relationalism and variabilism can do
quite a lot of philosophically interesting work. But before applying the dis-
tinction, I want to defend it. The distinction between relationalism and vari-
abilism rests on the distinction between an n+1-ary property with a fixed
extension and an n-ary property with a variable extension, a distinction which
some philosophers reject.19 I call what follows the terminological objec-
tion, for it alleges that the difference between relationalism and variabilism
parameter is occupied just if there is an individual who belongs to it. We can then
distinguish strong and weak extensional variation. There is strong extensional variation
just if the extension of the property varies across occupied values of the parameter. Weak
extensional variation is extensional variation that is not strong. For example, presentists
and eternalists might agree that shape properties have extensions that vary across time.
For presentists, non-present times are unoccupied, so the extensional variation is weak. For
eternalists, non-present times are occupied, so the extensional variation is strong. Thanks
to John Hawthorne for discussion on this point.
18Distinctions akin to the relationalism/variabilism distinction are often drawn in the
literature on time and tense; see, e.g., Bigelow (1991), Fine (2005; 2006a), and Schlesinger
(1995). Perhaps the closest cousin of the relationalism/variabilism distinction is Fine’s
(2005) distinction between internal and external relativism. One important difference,
however: the internal/external distinction gives rise to only two relativity-engendering
ontological schemes, whereas the relationalism/variabilism distinction gives rise to three.
19See, e.g., Lewis (1986, 52–53) and Hinchliff (1996, 122).
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is merely terminological.
Objection: We learn that an apparently n-ary property, F , is relative to a
parameter. Relationalists say that F is an unplugged n+1-ary property with
a fixed extension; variabilists say that F is an unplugged n-ary property with
a variable extension; I say that these are just two ways of talking. There is
no difference between an unplugged n+1-ary property with a fixed extension
and an unplugged n-ary property with a variable extension. Relationalism
and variabilism are terminological variants. Disputes between relationalists
and variabilists are verbal disputes.
Reply : Imagine two disputes that you and I might have. First, we might
have a ‘this versus that’ dispute. Both of us look into a box, and we agree
that there is only one thing in the box. You say that the thing is G; I say
that the thing is H. Our dispute will prove merely verbal if the thing in the
box is both G (as you use the term) and H (as I use the term). Second, we
might have a ‘this versus this and that’ dispute. You say that the one (and
only) thing in the box is G. I say that there are two things in the box: one
thing is G, and the other thing is H. Our dispute will prove merely verbal
only if it is a verbal matter as to whether there is a second thing in the box.
It is natural to construe the dispute between relationalists and variabilists
as a ‘this versus that’ dispute—there is one thing in the world, and the dispute
between relationalists and variabilists is about how to classify it. But this
is a mistake. The dispute between relationalists and variabilists is a ‘this
versus this and that’ dispute. Let me explain.
Suppose that an apparently n-ary property is relative to a parameter.
We can divide relationalism into its positive claim and its negative claim.
The positive claim is that there is both an unplugged n+1-ary property with
a fixed extension and a large family of plugged n-ary properties with fixed
extensions. The negative claim is that there is no such thing as the unplugged
n-ary property.
Variabilists, I think, should always accept the positive claim.20 Thus, in
20Once we divide relationalism into its positive claim and its negative claim, we can
distinguish accommodating variabilism and unaccommodating variabilism. Unac-
commodating variabilists reject both claims; accommodating variabilists reject only the
negative claim. I see little to recommend unaccommodating variabilism, so I set it aside
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the dispute between relationalists and variabilists, there is much common
ground. They agree that there is an unplugged n+1 ary property, they agree
about its extension, and they agree that the extension is fixed across the
parameter. They agree that there is a large family of plugged n-ary proper-
ties, they agree about their extensions, and they agree that the extensions
are fixed across the parameter. Moreover, they agree about the conditional:
if there is such a thing as the unplugged n-ary property, then it has a vari-
able extension. What relationalists and variabilists disagree about is whether
there is such a thing as the unplugged n-ary property. Relationalists think
not; variabilists think so.21 Vis-a´-vis relationalism, variabilism is a thesis of
ontological super-addition: that the world contains everything relationalists
believe in and more besides.
In my experience, noting that the dispute between relationalists and vari-
abilists is a ‘this versus this and that’ dispute satisfies many of the skeptics.
They come to the same two conclusions that I do: that the dispute between
relationalists and variabilists is an ontological dispute about which objects
instantiate which properties, and that the dispute is as genuine as other on-
tological disputes of the same sort. (Compare the dispute about whether
external world objects are colored.)
Other skeptics, however, of a more dogged anti-metaphysical bent, press
the terminological objection further. At this point, the question is second-
order: Is it a substantive matter as to whether the unplugged n-ary property
is instantiated? The more dogged skeptic thinks not. What can be said to
the more dogged skeptic? Let me say two things.
First, a challenge. There are methods in first-order ontology for determin-
ing whether a putative property is instantiated. Employing these methods
seems to reveal differences between cases of relativity, and the differences do
not seem to be verbal; they seem to be worldly and genuine.
in the body of the text.
21The disagreement between relationalists and variabilists, as I have characterized it,
belongs to ontology. There is a related disagreement that can arise between people who
agree about the ontology, however. Take two variabilists. The first thinks that the un-
plugged n+1-ary property is more fundamental than the unplugged n-ary property—she
is a priority relationalist. The second thinks that the unplugged n-ary property is more
fundamental than the unplugged n+1-ary property—she is a priority variabilist.
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Start with the switch-the-index test. In cases of relative contrariety,
if we switch the index on the underlying parameter, variabilism predicts a
change in properties, while relationalism predicts no change in properties.
As it turns out, the switch-the-index-test cuts both ways.
In the case of shape, the test favors variabilism. If shape is relative to
time, then an object, O, might be bent at t1 and straight at t2. Relationalists
and variabilists agree that <O, t1> instantiate the binary relation being
bent at, that <O, t2> instantiate the binary relation being straight at, and
that O instantiates the plugged properties being bent at t1 and being bent
at t2. The question is whether the unplugged unary shape properties are
instantiated. Employ the switch-the-index test. Suppose that time passes
from t1 to t2. Has O undergone a change of shape properties? Relationalists
say, “No; the only shape properties that O has are the plugged properties,
and objects do not gain or lose their plugged shape properties over time. At
t1, O instantiates both being bent at t1 and being straight at t2, and at t2,
O instantiates both being bent at t1 and being straight at t2.” Variabilists
say, “Yes; at t1, O instantiates being bent. Then, from t1 to t2, O undergoes
a change of shape properties, loses the property being bent and gains the
property being straight.” Since intuitively O does undergo a change of shape
properties from t1 to t2, the switch-the-index test favors variabilism.
In the case of size, however, the switch-the-index test favors relational-
ism. Big and small are relative to comparison class: Remy, a big mouse, is
big relative to mice and small relative to animals. Are the unplugged unary
properties being big and being small instantiated? Employ the switch-the-
index test. Suppose that we change the salient comparison class. (It does
not matter whether we change the comparison class synchronically or di-
achronically, but it is easier to imagine the change diachronically.) At first,
Remy is surrounded by other, smaller mice, and then we gradually replace
the mice with bigger animals. Has Remy undergone a change in size prop-
erties? Relationalists say, “No; the only size properties that Remy has are
plugged properties, and changing the salient comparison class does not re-
sult in a change of plugged size properties.” Variabilists say, “Yes; when
mice are the salient comparison class, Remy instantiates being big. Then,
when the salient comparison class changes, Remy undergoes a change of size
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properties, loses the property being big and gains the property being small.”
Since intuitively Remy does not undergo a change in size properties when the
salient comparison class switches from mice to animals, the switch-the-index
test favors relationalism.22
Another test is the real similarity test. Suppose that O1 and O2 exist
just for an instant of time. O1 is bent at t1, and O2 is bent at t2. Are
O1 and O2 exactly similar in a shape respect? Intuitively yes. And since
exact similarity in a respect is a matter of sharing properties, and since O1
and O2 do not share any plugged shape properties, this is evidence that the
unplugged unary shape properties are instantiated. By contrast, Remy is
big relative to mice, and Jupiter is big relative to planets. Are Remy and
Jupiter exactly similar in a size respect? Intuitively not. And since exact
similarity in a respect is a matter of sharing properties, this is evidence that
the unplugged unary shape properties are not instantiated.
The switch-the-index test and the real similarity test reveal differences
between the relativity of shape to time, on the one hand, and the relativity
of size to comparison class on the other. Moreover, the differences seem to
be worldly and genuine, not merely verbal: the fact that Remy and Jupiter
are not exactly similar in a size respect has nothing to do with how we talk.
The challenge to the dogged skeptics, then, is to explain away the apparent
worldliness of the differences between cases of relativity.
The second thing I want to say, however, is much more practical-minded.
Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding. The best way to know whether
a distinction is genuine is to put the distinction to work. If the work it
does is genuine, the distinction is genuine; if the work it does is mere word
chopping, the distinction is verbal. Like other endurantists, I think that
shape variabilism is a significant improvement over shape relationalism. But
I think the distinction between relationalism and variabilism most clearly
does philosophical work in the case of colors, which is why I consider the case
22Like me, Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008, 9–11) defends relationalism about shape:
“When people say “That is big” of a thing, they are not ascribing a property bigness to
it: they are ascribing different properties to the things. One person may be ascribing
the property ‘being a big mouse’. Another may be ascribing the property ‘being a big
animal’. . . . [T]here is no such property as bigness.”
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of color relativism in §6. Color variabilism enjoys genuine and philosophically
important advantages over color relationalism, and this makes it very likely,
I think, that the distinction between relationalism and variabilism is itself
genuine and philosophically important.
5 Three Distinctions
The distinction between relationalism and variabilism is a distinction within
relativism. The desire to draw a distinction within relativism is not, of
course, new. In this section I compare the distinction between relationalism
and variabilism to two others: namely, the distinction between contextualism
and truth relativism and the distinction between properties and so-called
‘centering features’. As we get clearer about the notion of a property, we see
that the three distinctions, though related in interesting ways, are separate
and should be treated as such.
Nota Bene: Readers who want to cut to the chase and see what philo-
sophical work can be done with the relationalism/variabilism distinction can
skip ahead to §6 without loss of continuity.
5.1 Contextualism / Truth Relativism
Objection: The distinction between relationalism and variabilism is simply
a repackaging of the distinction between contextualism and truth rel-
ativism. Relationalists and variabilists agree that the unplugged n+1-ary
properties and the plugged n-ary properties exist and have extensions that are
fixed across the parameter. The question is whether there are the unplugged
n-ary properties. We can understand the dispute between contextualists and
truth relativists in an exactly parallel way. Both sides agree that there are
the many relativized propositions (e.g. the proposition that O is bent at
t1 ) and that the relativized propositions have their truth-values absolutely.
The question is whether there are the unrelativized propositions (e.g. the
proposition that O is bent). Both sides agree that the unrelativized proposi-
tions, if they exist, have their truth-values relatively. Why think that there
are two distinctions here, rather than just one?
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Reply : The dispute between contextualism and truth relativism is a dis-
pute in semantics and should be settled by semantical considerations. The
dispute between relationalism and variabilism is a dispute in ontology and
should be settled by ontological considerations. There are some interesting
parallels, to be sure. But the two disputes are separate. In fact, they can
come apart. There are a number of domains in which, in my opinion, the
most plausible combination of views is truth relativism and relationalism.
One can ensure that the distinctions do not come apart by adopting a
bridge principle that connects semantics and ontology. For example, if we
adopt a Russellian conception of propositions, on which propositions are
built out of worldly items (i.e. particulars and properties), then the two
distinctions will necessarily coincide.
The cost of these bridge principles is decreased autonomy, and I think the
cost is too high. The sorts of considerations that move us to truth relativism
are internal to semantics: data about cross-context disagreements, indirect
speech reports, third-party assessments, and so on. The considerations that
move us to variabilism are internal to ontology.23 The semantic data and the
ontological data can point in opposite directions, however. There might be
good reason to adopt truth relativism about epistemic modals,24 for example,
even though there is very little reason to believe in the unary property of
might-ness. If you accept a bridge principle, then neither the semantics nor
the ontology is autonomous. The dispute between contextualists and truth
relativists cannot be settled wholly on semantic grounds, and the dispute
between relationalists and variabilists cannot be settled wholly on ontological
grounds. (I suppose that if you accept a bridge principle, the interesting
upshot of this paper is that we can use arguments in ontology—arguments
about change, real similarity, higher-order properties, etc.—to get further
traction on the dispute between contextualists and truth relativists.) In my
view, the reasons in favor of autonomy outweigh the reasons in favor of bridge
principles. If the semantic data and the ontological data point in opposite
23Relevant ontological considerations include: change, real similarity, higher-order prop-
erties, and property exclusion.
24Notable defenses of truth relativism about concerns epistemic modals includes Egan
(2011), MacFarlane (2011a; 2014), and Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2005).
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directions, the distinctions should be allowed to come apart.
My preferred way to ensure autonomy for both semantics and ontology
is to distinguish semantic values and properties.25
It is helpful to approach the distinction between semantic values and
properties by way of an analogy. Consider the stage view of persistence.26
On the stage view, nothing persists. There is Obama-at-t1, Obama-at-t2,
Obama-at-t3, and so on, and while these objects are similar and connected
in various ways, they are not identical. Of course, the English language
contains the name ‘Obama’, and we use this name at various times. Stage
theorists maintain that ‘Obama’ denotes different objects at different times.
At t1, ‘Obama’ denotes Obama-at-t1. At t2, ‘Obama’ denotes Obama-at-
t2.27
With the stage view in mind, suppose that semanticists come to agree
(a) that there is such a thing as the unrelativized proposition that Obama
is bent and (b) that the truth-value of this proposition varies over time. Q :
Does the existence of this proposition pose a threat to the stage view of
persistence? A: Not a whit! Stage theorists should conclude that there is
a sort of relativity in truthmaking, i.e., that different objects are alethically
relevant to the same proposition at different times. At t1, the truth-value of
25The distinction between semantic values and properties is at issue in the dispute
between Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009; 2011) and MacFarlane (2007; 2011a; 2011b;
2014). Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) claim that truth relativism is incompatible with
the unarity of truth. MacFarlane (2011b, 442) replies, “Old school relativists might have
refused to call propositions ‘true’ of ‘false’ without adding a qualification, but the analytic
[truth] relativists Cappelen and Hawthorne are discussing are happy to make room for a
monadic truth predicate that behaves disquotationally. . . . Moreover, it is easy to make
room for a monadic ‘true’ and ‘false’ that works in the analytic [truth] relativist framework
and ratifies the disquotational inference. Roughly stated: ‘true’ expresses a property,
truth, whose extension at a circumstance of evaluation is the set of propositions that are
true-at that circumstance of evaluation.” In other words, contemporary truth relativists
assign a semantic value to the predicate ‘is true’. In a rejoinder, Cappelen and Hawthorne
(2011, 459) say, “MacFarlane’s discussion. . . confuses a monadic property with a monadic
predicate.” Cappelen and Hawthorne object to MacFarlane’s move from semantics values
to properties.
26See Hawley (2004) and Sider (1996; 2003).
27This is a slight oversimplification. In tensed sentences, e.g., ‘I saw Obama yesterday’,
‘Obama’ can name past or future objects.
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the proposition that Obama is bent depends wholly on the shape of Obama-
at-t1 ; the shape of Obama-at-t2 is alethically irrelevant. At t2, the truth-
value of the proposition that Obama is bent depends wholly on the shape of
Obama-at-t2 ; the shape of Obama-at-t1 is alethically irrelevant.
I note the stage theory of persistence to underscore the fact that we
already distinguish semantic values and particulars. The fact that a name
has a semantic value relative to each index on a parameter does not imply
that the same particular is the semantic value relative to each index. I think
that the same point applies on the predicate side of things, too. Just as
we distinguish semantic values and particulars, so too we should distinguish
semantic values and properties. The fact that a predicate has a semantic
value relative to each index on a parameter does not imply that the same
property is the semantic value relative to each index.
To keep things simple, stick with the same example. If endurantism is
true (and presentism is false), then shape is relative to time. What form of
shape relativism should we adopt, relationalism or variabilism?
Suppose that we are relationalists about shape, and suppose, as before,
that semanticists come to agree (a) that there is such a thing as the unrel-
ativized proposition that Obama is bent and (b) that the truth-value of this
proposition varies across time. Q : Does the existence of this proposition pose
a threat to relationalism about shape? A: Not a whit! Relationalists should
believe that there is a sort of relativity in truthmaking, i.e., that different
properties are alethically relevant to the same proposition at different times.
At t1, the truth-value of the proposition that Obama is bent depends wholly
on whether Obama (the enduring object) has the property being bent at t1 ;
whether Obama has the property being bent at t2 is alethically irrelevant.
At t2, the truth-value of the proposition that Obama is bent depends wholly
on whether Obama has the property being bent at t2 ; whether Obama has
the property being bent at t1 is alethically irrelevant.
Suppose, instead, that we are variabilists about shape. As variabilists, we
do not explain truth-value relativity in terms of truthmaking relativity. The
same property is alethically relevant to the proposition, irrespective of which
index on the parameter we choose; both at t1 and at t2, the truth-value of
the proposition that Obama is bent depends wholly on whether Obama has
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the property being bent. But the extension of being bent does (or can) vary
across time, and therefore the truth-value of the proposition Obama is bent
does (or can) vary across time as well.
In fact, this points generalizes. If truth relativism is true of some predi-
cate, then the predicate has a semantic value and the semantic value can vary
across the parameter in question. As a result, propositions expressed by sen-
tences containing the predicate can vary in truth-value across the parameter.
But both relationalism and variabilism are compatible with truth relativism.
Relationalists think that the semantic value of a predicate is different prop-
erties relative to different indices; variabilists think that the semantic value
of the predicate is the same property relative to all of the indices.28
Although I do not have the space to argue the point here, I think that we
get examples of at least three of the four options. When it comes to colors,
I am inclined toward truth relativism and variabilism. When it comes to
epistemic modals, I am inclined toward truth relativism and relationalism.
When it comes to size, I am inclined toward contextualism and relational-
ism. (In personal communication Judy Thomson has expressed to me her
sympathy for the fourth combination; she is inclined toward contextualism
and variabilism in the case of shape.)
We are familiar with the debate between contextualists and truth rela-
tivists. Contextualism is the default view; we need some positive argument to
move us to truth relativism. We can think of arguments for truth relativism
as semantic indispensability arguments. Truth relativists draw our attention
to certain semantic phenomena (agreement and disagreement, patterns of as-
sertion and retraction, various third-party assessments, etc.) and argue that
we cannot properly account for the semantic phenomena without counte-
nancing the unrelativized propositions and their relative truth-values.29 All
of this is as it should be: the questions what propositions there are and how
28Wright (2008) gestures toward a similar distinction. He distinguishes the “ternary
model” of truth relativism, which corresponds roughly to the relativism about truthmaking
that I mention in the text, with relativism about “truth-conferrers,” which corresponds
more closely to variabilism as I think of it.
29See, among many others, Brogaard (2010), Egan (2010), Egan, Hawthorne, and
Weatherson (2009), Ko¨lbel (2002; 2003; 2004), Lasersohn (2005), MacFarlane (2002; 2007;
2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2014), Richard (2004), and Weatherson (2009).
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the truth-values of these propositions vary across parameters are semantic
questions to be settled by semantic considerations.
The dispute between relationalists and variabilists has a similar structure
but a different subject matter. Relationalism is the default view; we need
some positive arguments to move us to variabilism. Arguments for variabil-
ism are essentially ontological indispensability arguments. Variabilists draw
out attention to certain ontological phenomena (see fn. 23) and argue that
we cannot properly explain the phenomena without countenancing the un-
plugged n-ary properties and their variable extensions. This, too, is as it
should be: the questions what properties there are and how the extensions
of these properties vary across parameters are ontological questions to be
settled by ontological considerations.
That is not to say that there are no connections between semantics and
ontology. I am sometimes inclined to think that variabilism implies truth
relativism. But the reverse is certainly not the case. No argument from cross-
context disagreements, or third-party assessments, or data about assertion
and retraction should convince anyone to adopt variabilism.
5.2 Properties / Centering Features
Objection: Variabilists maintain that we should expand our ontology to in-
clude the unplugged n-ary and their variable extensions. What are these
entities? I say that they are nothing new. Recall the distinction between
a possible world and a centered possible world. We represent properties as
functions from possible worlds to sets of objects. We represent centering
features as functions from centered possible worlds to sets of objects.30 An
unplugged n-ary property with a variable extension is just a centering feature
called by a much less lovely name.
Reply : Centering features are represented as functions from centered
worlds to sets because they do not contribute to the way the world is. One
could know exactly which world is actual without knowing (e.g.) whether
Shanghai is nearby. By contrast, the posits of variabilism do indeed con-
tribute to the way the world is. To anticipate the next section, consider
30The name ‘centering feature’ is due to Egan. See Egan (2006a; 2006b; 2010a).
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color variabilism, i.e., the thesis that the extensions of color properties vary
across types of perceivers. By the lights of color variabilism, it is not true
that one could know exactly which world is actual without knowing (e.g.)
whether grass is green. As a result, unlike the thesis that colors are center-
ing features,31 color variabilism induces a relativism about actuality. If color
variabilism is true, then different worlds are actual relative to different types
of perceivers.32
Here, then, are two differences: unlike centering features, the posits of
variabilism contribute to how the world is; and unlike centering features,
the posits of variabilism should be represented as functions from possible
worlds (not centered possible worlds) to sets. Here is a third difference.
Centering features are not sensitive to the tests I mentioned above. When
I am in Shandong, Shanghai is nearby. As I fly home, Shanghai ceases to
be nearby. Has Shanghai, itself, changed? Intuitively not. Gaining and
losing a centering feature does not constitute genuine change. The same
goes for similarity. When I am in Shandong, both Shanghai and Beijing are
nearby. Does that make Shanghai and Beijing, themselves, exactly similar in
a (locational?) respect? Intuitively not.33 Sharing a centering feature does
not make objects similar.
There is a view—centrism—which, ontologically speaking, is relational-
ism plus centering features. Variabilism and centrism are different because
properties and centering features are different. Variabilism is relationalism
plus properties. The dispute between variabilism and centrism is really quite
interesting, I think, but afield from the present discussion, so for the remain-
der of this essay I put centrism and centering features aside.
31The thesis that colors are centering features has been defended by Brogaard (2010)
and Egan (2006a; 2006b; 2010a).
32For other discussions of relativism about actuality, see Bigelow (1991), Fine (2005),
Goodman (1978), and Rovane (2011).
33At most, the pair <Shandong, Shanghai> is exactly similar to the pair <Shandong,
Beijing>. But it is binary properties that make pairs similar.
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6 Color Relativism
The main motivation for color relativism is the phenomenon of color per-
ception variation. The same object, in the same viewing environment, looks
different colors to different types of perceivers, and singling out one type
of perceiver (among the many that seem normal and non-defective) as the
type that sees colors veridically seems arbitrary and metaphysically unmoti-
vated.34 I want to consider the case of color relativism for two reasons.
First, focusing too intently on shape relativism and the problem of tem-
porary intrinsics can have a distorting effect. One can get the mistaken
impression that the problem has something essentially to do with time or
tense. (In fact, one of the leading responses to the problem of temporary
intrinsics is called ‘taking tense seriously’.35) The problem of temporary in-
trinsics is really just an instance of a much more general problem: namely,
the problem of relative contrariety. Suppose that F and G are contrary
properties, and suppose that x1, x2, . . . , are values on some parameter X.
The problem of relative contrariety is the problem of how the selfsame ob-
ject can be both F relative to x1 and G relative to x2, despite the fact that
nothing can be both F and G. Since some properties are relative to time,
some instances of the problem involve the time parameter. But if properties
are relative to other parameters (world, culture, type of perceiver, etc.), then
the same problem arises without tense or time playing any role. The case of
color relativism is interesting in part because it involves synchronic relativity.
According to color relativism, color is relative to type of perceiver.36
Second, color variabilism is plausible. In the literature, color relativism
and color relationalism are often conflated together. This is unfortunate,
because many of the arguments marshaled against color relativism, though
they bite against color relationalism, are toothless against color variabilism.
I cannot give a full defense of color variabilism here,37 but I will argue that
34The argument from perceptual variation to color relativism is defended in many places,
but the most thorough defense is in Cohen (2009).
35See, e.g., Zimmerman (2005).
36Of course, if endurantism is true, then color is also relative to time. But the sort of
color relativism that I am interested in here would arise even if perdurantism were true.
37For a defense of color relativism, see, among others, Cohen (2009), Johnston (1992),
23
some of the metaphysical reasons to reject color relationalism are not like-
wise reasons to reject color variabilism. If my arguments succeed, then the
distinction between relationalism and variabilism stands vindicated, since a
reason to reject a theory is also a reason to reject any terminological variant
of it.
Take a uniformly colored object, for example, color chip 527. According
to color relativism, chip 527 is different colors relative to different types of
perceivers. John sees chip 527 as plum (a particular shade of reddish-blue),
and Jane sees chip 527 as aqua (a particular shade of greenish-blue). Accord-
ing to color relativism, both John and Jane might see chip 527 veridically.
For John and Jane are different types of perceivers—John is an S1, let us
say, and Jane is an S2 —and chip 527 might be plum for S1 ’s and aqua for
S2 ’s.
Opponents of color relativism often allege that color relativists misidentify
the color properties. Every theory of color must answer this question: Which
properties are the colors? A color relationalist has only two options: (a) take
the colors to be the binary relations, being plum for, being aqua for, . . . , or
(b) take the colors to be the plugged properties, being plum for S1’s, being
plum for S2’s, . . . , being aqua for S1’s, . . . . But there are good reasons for
thinking that the colors are neither the binary properties nor the plugged
properties.
Why aren’t the colors the binary properties? Because colors are not
relations! Colors are unary, not poly-ary. Think of it in terms of bearers.
There is a basketball in the room. What is orange? The correct answer: the
basketball. The incorrect answer: a curious bit of ontological miscellany, viz.,
the <object, type of perceiver> pair, whose first member is the basketball
and whose second member is the type of perceiver S1.
Why aren’t the colors the plugged properties? Let me offer three argu-
ments in ascending order of strength.
First, color phenomenology.38 Colors do not appear to be plugged prop-
and McLaughlin (2003).
38Philosophers who have run the color phenomenology argument include Armstrong
(1986), McGinn (1996), and Tye (2000). For a reply on behalf of color relationalism, see
Cohen (2010).
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erties; they appear to be simple, intrinsic, unary, unplugged, nonrelational
properties of their bearers. Identifying the colors with the plugged proper-
ties thus makes color phenomenology misleading, and it is strange for phe-
nomenology to be misleading about colors.
Second, color exclusion.39 Some colors are determinates of others, and
some colors are maximally determinate. Intuitively, maximally determinate
color properties should exclude one another. It should be impossible for a
uniformly colored object to instantiate more than one maximally determinate
color property. But if colors are the plugged properties, then maximally
determinate color properties do not exclude one another. Both being plum
for S1’s and being aqua for S2’s are maximally determinate color properties,
and chip 527 instantiates both, and many more besides.
Third, color individuation.40 The plugged properties can be sorted in a
variety of ways. One way is by their heads. Two plugged properties are
head-alike if and only if they are constituted by the same color relation.
If we identify colors with the plugged properties, then there are head-alike
color properties: e.g., being plum for S1’s and being plum for S2’s. But I
think that the notion of head-alike color properties is absurd: color properties
cannot be similar to one another in the way that head-alike color properties
would have to be. A case helps to bring this out.
The Simultaneous Switch : Suppose that Wyatt and Brody are intrin-
sics duplicates—both are S1 ’s. Wyatt, the control, sits before a uniformly
colored screen that occupies his entire visual field. The screen looks to Brody
a particular shade of forest green. In a duplicate room, we sit Brody before a
duplicate screen. The duplicate screen looks to Brody exactly the way that
Wyatt’s screen looks to Wyatt. We then gradually transform Brody’s visual
system—change a neural connection, alter a rod or cone, change the shape of
the eye—but always by non-invasive techniques that are totally undetectable
from the inside. By the end of our tinkering, Brody is a different type of per-
ceiver: Brody has transformed from being an S1 to being an S2. If we were
to leave the screen unaltered, the screen would look discernibly different to
39Philosophers who have run the color exclusion argument include Chalmers (2006),
Kalderon (2007), Pautz (n.d.), and Tye (2006).
40So far as I know, this is a novel argument against color relationalism.
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Brody-the-S2 than it did to Brody-the-S1. But we are clever and meticulous
scientists. For each alteration to Brody’s visual system, we make a simulta-
neous and counterbalancing alteration to the screen’s surface, thus inducing
in Brody what seems to him an uninterrupted, phenomenally unchanging
visual experience as of forest green. In fact, the visual experience enjoyed by
Brody during the course of the experiment is phenomenologically identical
to the visual experience enjoyed by Wyatt in the other room. Afterwards,
Wyatt and Brody report, with equal confidence, that the screen before them
did not change in color.
Our task is to count color properties. Wyatt has seen only a single color
property during the course of the experiment. How many color properties has
Brody seen? If we identify the colors with the plugged properties, then Brody
has seen at least two color properties—two head-alike color properties—
namely, being forest green for S1’s and being forest green for S2’s. But that
seems false to me. Much has changed both in and around Brody, but the
color he was seeing remained the same. Head-alike color properties would
have to be exactly similar to one another in the way they look;41 in other
words, head-alike color properties would have to be phenomenologically iden-
tical. But I say that it belies the nature of colors for there to be distinct color
properties that are exactly similar in how they look. I am inclined to indi-
viduate colors by how they look: if C1 and C2 are color properties, then
C1 and C2 are identical if and only if they are exactly similar in how they
look.42
All three of these arguments are arity arguments whose conclusion is that
colors are unplugged unary properties. Construed as arguments against color
relationalism, these arguments seem to me nearly decisive. There are good
reasons for thinking that color is relative to type of perceiver, sure, but there
are even better reasons for thinking that colors are neither binary properties
41Head-alike color properties are not just indiscernible, in the way that red10 and red11
are. They are identical in the way they look.
42If one balks at talk of how a color property itself looks, then this claim could be
modified slightly: if C1 and C2 are color properties, then C1 and C2 are identical if and
only if the way that C1 objects look (when they look C1 ) is exactly similar to the way
that C2 objects look (when they look C2 ). Thanks to Boris Kment for discussion on this
point.
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nor plugged properties. Color relativists who adopt color variabilism, how-
ever, have a ready reply to all three arguments. About phenomenology color
variabilists say, “Color phenomenology is not misleading. Colors are simple,
intrinsic,43 unary, unplugged, nonrelational properties of their bearers, just
as they appear to be.” About exclusion color variabilists say, “Maximally
determinate color properties do indeed exclude one another. Chip 527 has
exactly one maximally determinate color property, although it is a variable
matter as to which maximally determinate color property chip 527 has.44”
About individuation color variabilists say, “Colors are indeed individuated by
the ways they look. Head-alike color properties are impossible and absurd.”
My thesis is not that color variabilism is true. Rather, my thesis is that
color variabilism enjoys real and philosophically important advantages over
color relationalism. There are good reasons for thinking that color is relative,
and there are good reasons for thinking that colors are unplugged unary
properties. Color variabilism is the way to consistently hold both theses.
7 Instantiation Relativism
We return, finally, to whether relativity and simplicity are compatible. Take
the case of shape. An object is bent simpliciter if and only if the object stands
in the unplugged binary instantiation relation to the unplugged unary prop-
erty being bent. There are least three ontological schemes that can engender
43The question whether variable colors are intrinsic is somewhat complicated. Relative
to any type of perceiver, duplicates are necessarily color indiscernible. But the very object
that is plum (relative to S1’s) is not plum but rather aqua (relative to S2’s).
44Color variabilists (at least accommodating color variabilists; see fn. 20) agree with
color relationalists that chip 527 instantiates a plethora of plugged properties, among
them both being plum for S1’s and being aqua for S2’s. This fact helps to clarify the color
exclusion problem. The problem for color relationalism is not that it predicts that there
are many plugged properties on the surfaces of things. Rather, the problem is that the
properties which color relationalists identify as the colors are ill-fit to play the color role.
Part what makes some properties fit to be the colors is (a) that they stand in relations of
determinate-determinable and (b) that the maximally determinate properties exclude one
another. The properties that color relationalists identify as the colors satisfy (a) but not
(b). The properties that color variabilists identify as the colors satisfy both (a) and (b).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to say more about color exclusion.
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the relativity of shape to time, and at least one of them reconciles relativity
and simplicity.
As shape relativists, we face a choice: Should we be relationalists or
variabilists about shape?
Start with relationalism. Suppose that an object, O, is bent at t1 and
straight at t2. If relationalism about shape is true, then O, at t1, is bent, but
not bent simpliciter. O does not stand in the unplugged binary instantiation
relation to the unplugged unary property being bent.
Turn to variabilism, then. If variabilism about shape is true, then the
unplugged unary shape properties have extensions that vary across time.
This is true in general: if there are properties whose extensions vary across
a parameter, then instantiation is relative to that parameter. Variabilism
implies instantiation relativism. We thus face another choice: Should we be
relationalists or variabilists about instantiation?
Suppose that we are variabilists about shape and relationalists about
instantiation. Call this single variabilism. If single variabilism is true,
then O, at t1, is bent, but not bent simpliciter. O does not stand in the
unplugged binary instantiation relation to the unplugged unary property
being bent.
The option that has gone unnoticed is double variabilism. To reconcile
relativity and simplicity, we need a form of relativism that is not founded
ultimately on relationalism. We need to sever the connection between rel-
ativity and relationality, and I believe that we can. We can be variabilists
both about shape and about instantiation.45 If double variabilism is true,
45Double variabilism, as I conceive of it, is a form of relativism that is not founded
ultimately on relationalism. I do not believe in a second-order instantiation relation. A
second-order instantiation relation would relate first-order instantiation relations, proper-
ties, and objects. (If we need a second-order instantiation relation, then presumably we
need a third-order instantiation relation, and so on. But that way lies Bradley Regress;
cf. Lewis (2002, 6).) If there is a second-order instantiation relation, then, in principle, we
could be variabilists both about shapes and about (first-order) instantiation by being rela-
tionalists about second-order instantiation. This would be a variabilism about (first-order)
instantiation that is founded ultimately on relationalism, not the sort of view that I find
interesting. The important question, as I see it, is not whether we are variabilists about
(first-order) instantiation but whether our relativism is founded ultimately on relational-
ism. Arity arguments that can be recast as simplicity arguments can be recast again as
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then O, at t1, is bent, and bent simpliciter. O stands in the unplugged binary
instantiation relation to the unplugged unary property being bent.
The same goes for other cases. Moral relativism is compatible with ac-
tions being right or wrong simpliciter. Truth relativism is compatible with
propositions being true or false simpliciter. We reconcile relativity and n-ary-
ness with one application of the relationalism/variabilism distinction, and we
reconcile relativity and simplicity with two applications.
All three forms of relativism—relationalism, single variabilism, and dou-
ble variabilism—have their occasion. When a thesis of relativity faces com-
pelling arity arguments, and the objections encapsulated in the arity argu-
ments can be recast in simplicity arguments, double variabilism is the best
option. For example, suppose that what convinces us that shapes are not bi-
nary properties is the phenomenon of real change. We think that real change
is not adequately captured by thinking of objects as (eternally) instantiating
a variety of plugged shape properties. Relationalism is a bad option, then.
But so too is single variabilism. After all, if we fail to capture real change
by thinking of objects as (eternally) instantiating a variety of plugged shape
properties, then we also fail to capture real change by thinking of objects as
(eternally) standing in a variety of plugged instantiation relations to various
unplugged unary shape properties.46 Double variabilism does better. Ac-
cording to double variabilism, as the shape of the object changes over time,
the object (temporarily) stands in the unplugged instantiation relation to
different unplugged unary shape properties.
Note, however, that arity arguments cannot always be recast as simplic-
ity arguments. Consider the color individuation objection, which alleges
that head-alike color properties are impossible and absurd. In response to
the color individuation objection, a move from color relationalism to single
variabilism is fine. There is no way to recast the color individuation objection
as a simplicity argument. When a thesis of relativity faces compelling arity
second-order simplicity arguments and make trouble for relationalism about second-order
instantiation. The only way to avoid these arguments is to adopt a form of relativism
that is not founded ultimately on relationalism, i.e., double variabilism as I conceive of
it. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to say more about double variabilism
and second-order instantiation.
46Cf. Merricks (1994, 169): “Once tly bent, always tly bent.”
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arguments, and the objections encapsulated in the arity arguments cannot
be recast as simplicity arguments, single variabilism is the best option.
Finally, arity arguments are not always germane. There are no compelling
arity argument against the claim that size is relative to comparison class, fox
example. When a thesis of relativity face no compelling arity arguments,
relationalism is the best option.
Of the three forms of relativism, double variabilism is the most radical.
We are accustomed to thinking that there must be some absolutist perch from
which all of the facts can be seen together, but there is no such absolutist
perch, if double variabilism is true. Relative to one index on a parameter, an
object stands in the unplugged binary instantiation relation to a property,
and relative to another index on the parameter, the selfsame object does not
stand in the unplugged binary instantiation relation to the selfsame property.
If we think indices as having opinions about which properties are had by
which objects, the indices disagree and contradict one another.
But there is an interesting point to be made here. Absolutists and double
variabilists agree about the basic ontological ingredients. Absolutists and
relationalists disagree about the first-order ontology; they disagree about
whether objects have plugged or unplugged properties. Absolutists and sin-
gle variabilists disagree about the first-order ontology; they disagree about
whether objects and properties are glued together with a plugged or un-
plugged instantiation relation. But absolutists and double variabilists agree
about the first-order ontology. The interesting point, then, is that we can re-
move the first-order ontological differences between absolutists and relativists
without destroying the disagreement between them.47 Absolutists and rela-
tivists can agree about the basic ontological ingredients and disagree about
whether those very ingredients are absolute or relative.
47There is an ontological difference between absolutism and double variabilism. The
difference concerns the extensions of certain properties. For example, a double variabilist
about shape will think that the same object might instantiate both being bent at t1 and
being straight at t2 ; absolutists will disagree.
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